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MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE RELIABILITY CHALLENGE 
David Faraci 
 
Moral perception has received a good deal of recent attention. There are a number of 
motivations for this, for instance certain phenomenological similarities between 
moral and perceptual experiences. But one distinctively epistemological motivation 
stands out. Given a traditional intuitionist moral epistemology, it is notoriously 
difficult for realists to account for even the possibility of moral knowledge. This has 
led some realists to go looking for an alternative to intuitionism. Perception is an 
obvious contender.  
 If this is one’s motivation, however, it is not enough to defend the existence 
of moral perception. One needs to show that perceptualism places one in a better 
epistemological position than intuitionism. One cause for worry here is that on many 
accounts moral perception is dependent on a priori background moral knowledge. 
While such accounts might enjoy some advantages over intuitionism, they are clearly 
no better off where certain fundamental epistemological challenges are concerned. In 
particular, such forms of perceptualism enjoy no advantage when it comes to 
arguably the most fundamental epistemological challenge to moral realism: the 
challenge to explain the reliability of our moral beliefs (‘the reliability challenge’).1 
I argued elsewhere that all perceptualists have this problem, that moral perception is 
necessarily dependent on non-perceptual background knowledge of moral bridge 
principles (Faraci 2015).2 In a recent response, Preston Werner (forthcoming) 
contends that my argument rests on an over-intellectualized picture of perception. In 
this paper, I argue that though Werner may well be correct, my arguments, properly 
                                                 
1 Or at least show that their commitments do not rule out the existence of such an explanation. 
This is sometimes put instead in terms of explaining our access to the moral truth, or the correlation 
between our moral beliefs and the moral truth (Enoch 2011, chap. 7). Like Enoch and many others, 
I also take popular genealogical challenges (e.g., Street’s (2006) evolutionary debunking argument) 
to be a close relatives of the reliability challenge.  
To be clear, this is a challenge for epistemologists, a challenge for accounts of moral knowledge per 
se, not a challenge to individuals’ moral knowledge. Nearly everyone agrees that we can know 
things without being able to explain our reliability (e.g., ancient Greeks knew things by 
perception). Some take there to be a derivative challenge for individuals: if we discover that there 
is no explanation for our supposed reliability in a domain, that serves as a defeater for our beliefs 
in that domain (e.g., Field 1989). This is orthogonal to the discussion on hand. 
2 In that paper, I did not explicitly frame things in terms of the reliability challenge, but recent 
work in this area, including Werner’s, has helped me to recognize this as my central concern (and 
I think I can charitably be read as implicitly focusing on this—see, especially, fn. 13 in that paper).  
2 
 
extended, still suggest that perceptualism leaves realists in no better position than 
intuitionism when it comes to the reliability challenge.3 
 
1. My Previous Argument 
The following is a reconstruction of my (2015) argument (with some minor changes 
to avoid snags irrelevant to the current discussion4): 
P1 Moral experiences are inferred (in the broadest sense, which 
includes sub-personal processing5) from non-moral experiences. 
P2  If A’s moral experience of M produces knowledge, where M is 
inferred from her non-moral experience of N, A must know that N 
implies M.  
P3  Knowledge of moral bridge principles such as N implies M is 
dependent on non-perceptual moral knowledge.  
C Therefore, perceptual moral knowledge is dependent on non-
perceptual moral knowledge. 
In defense of P1: Adapting the famous example from Harman (1977), when 
we see wrongness in the burning of a cat, that experience is inferred (again, in the 
broadest sense) from our experience of the descriptive features of cat-burning (a 
description I’ll spare you). Few doubt this (Werner does not), but for those who do, I 
argued via a counterfactual test: the ‘Convincing Fake Test’. Suppose we were to 
construct a convincing but fake cat-burning, one that apparently has the same 
descriptive features as an actual cat-burning (animatronic cat, holographic fire, etc.), 
but which lacks any wrong-making features. Insofar as someone tends to perceive 
wrongness in cat-burnings, they would surely tend to experience such convincing 
fakes as wrong. The best explanation for this tendency is that the original experience 
of wrongness was dependent on the experience of the relevant descriptive features. 
                                                 
3 For arguments related to both my earlier arguments and those raised herein, especially regarding 
the parity between perceptualist and intuitionist explanations for the reliability of our moral 
judgements, see Crow (2016) (though note that Crow limits his target to non-naturalism). 
4 Thanks to thank Preston Werner for alerting me to some of those snags, both in print and in 
discussion.  
5 Some may object to the use of ‘inference’ in referring to sub-personal processing. In this context, 
at least, nothing hangs on the choice of terminology. Those who prefer other usage can mentally 
substitute their preferred term. All that matters here is that there is a ‘transition’ from non-moral 
to moral experiences (or, perhaps better, a ‘dependence’ of one on the other, as the ‘transition’ 
may be instantaneous). As acknowledged in my earlier work, this requires the assumption that 
non-moral and moral experiences have different contents. This is largely irrelevant here, though 
I address it briefly in §3.  
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 In defense of P2: Suppose Sam experiences a cat-burning. And suppose he 
infers that what he experiences is wrong. It is hard to see how Sam could know that 
what he experiences is wrong if he doesn’t know the inference-grounding implication 
from cat-burning to wrongness. More generally, it seems plausible that inferences 
only produce knowledge if the inference-grounding implication is known.6 
In defense of P3: Suppose Sam knows that cat-burning implies wrongness by 
perception. Surely, perception of a principle depends on perception of the relevant 
relata; principles are not the sort of thing we can directly perceive. Consider, for 
instance, knowledge that when the air smells a certain way, it will (likely) rain soon. 
We experience the air’s smelling a certain way. And we experience rain. And we 
notice a correlation between the two. Arguably, we can thereby come to know, by 
perception, that a certain air quality implies rain. 
Suppose this is how Sam came to know that cat-burning implies wrongness. 
He had numerous experiences of cat-burning (yikes!) and of wrongness, and noticed 
a correlation between the two, which is why he believes that the former implies the 
latter. If we accept P1 and P2, it follows that Sam’s experiences of wrongness are 
dependent on background moral knowledge, so there must be some further principle 
Sam is relying on, such as that causing suffering implies wrongness. How does Sam 
know that causing suffering implies wrongness? Well, if it is by perception, then 
there will have to be some further principle that grounds his experiences of 
wrongness. And so on. The regress must stop at some point, and it will stop with a 
non-perceptual ground for Sam’s belief.  
In brief, then, my argument was that we infer moral experiences from non-
moral experiences (P1); such inferences can only produce knowledge if we know the 
relevant implication (P2); and knowledge of such implications can’t be perceptual, on 
                                                 
6 This is not wholly uncontroversial, though I find supposed counterexamples (see, e.g., Fitelson 
2010; Warfield 2005) unconvincing—something I cannot fully address here. What matters for our 
purposes is that even if the general principle is false, purported counterexamples all have certain 
features that Sam’s and other relevant cases lack. Note also that to the extent the principle is 
correct, it seems clear that it really is knowledge that is required; even justified true belief won’t 
do the trick. Suppose Sam justifiably, but falsely, believes that the amount of disutility created by 
burning a cat always outweighs the amount of utility sadists get from it. Sam is also justified in 
believing, falsely, that utilitarianism is true. Sam therefore believes that cat-burning is wrong, and 
infers from this that the particular cat-burning in front of him is wrong. And he’s correct: cat-
burning is wrong, just not for the reasons he thinks, so Sam doesn’t know that cat-burning is 
wrong; he’s been Gettiered. Surely, he therefore also doesn’t know that this particular cat-burning 
is wrong, given that he inferred the latter from the former.  
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pain of regress (P3). It follows that if there is perceptual moral knowledge, it is 
dependent on non-perceptual knowledge of moral bridge principles (C).7 
 
2. Werner’s Response 
Werner objects to P2. He more or less accepts that things are as I suggested when it 
comes to explicit, person-level inferences. But he argues that things are different in 
the case of sub-personal inferences. For there are plenty of cases, Werner maintains, 
where one experience is sub-personally inferred from another, and this produces 
knowledge, yet we have no beliefs about the relevant implication, and therefore no 
knowledge. For example: 
I can, typically, effortlessly distinguish the sound of a piano from that 
of an acoustic guitar. But I couldn’t even begin to explain this 
difference or point to the low level qualities of tone and timbre that 
ground their differences. I have no beliefs, much less knowledge, of 
how I go from low level auditory information to the auditory 
experience of a piano. (Werner forthcoming) 
 Werner therefore proposes that we replace P2 with the weaker: 
P2* If A’s moral experience of M produces knowledge, where M is 
inferred from her non-moral experience of N, then either (a) A knows 
that N implies M or (b) A’s “perceptual system contains subdoxastic 
information states which ground reliable transitions from perceptual 
information about [N] to perceptual information as of [M]” (Werner 
forthcoming) 
                                                 
7 There is an obvious worry here that this argument will overgeneralize, suggesting that no (or 
very little) knowledge is independently perceptual. For instance, bus-perception is clearly 
dependent on perception of certain shapes, colors, etc. Does this mean that we need to know that 
shapes and colors like that imply bus? There are really two issues here. The first anticipates 
Werner’s objection: I might be able to reliably infer busses from shapes and colors without 
believing—and therefore not knowing—any such implication. This will be addressed in what 
follows. Setting that aside, one might still worry that my argument implausibly suggests that there 
are no direct perceptions of busses. I partially addressed this in my (2015) by adding a caveat for 
experiences with the same contents; perhaps experiences of certain shapes and colors just are 
experiences of busses. There are other ways of cashing this out, and I’ll remain largely 
noncommittal here. The core point will be that there is a distinctive problem for moral perception, 
which is that on most metaethical views, what is mysterious is our (perceptual systems’) ability 
to learn which descriptive features imply which moral ones. By comparison, we should be able to 
tell a relatively simple story about how we or our perceptual systems learn to identify busses in 




 Consider Diane, who is just like Sam, except that instead of making an explicit 
inference, Diane experiences the cat-burning as wrong because she has a 
“subdoxastic information state” (from here I’ll drop “information”) that grounds 
reliable sub-personal inferences from experiences of cat-burnings to experiences of 
wrongness. It seems perfectly possible that Diane thereby knows that this particular 
cat-burning is wrong. Yet, as Werner points out, Diane doesn’t need to know that cat-
burning implies wrongness because Diane doesn’t even need to believe this.  
From here, I assume that Werner is correct about all this, that there may be 
moral perceptions that are independent of any a priori moral knowledge. My concern 
is what the move to P2* tells us about perceptualism’s ability to address the reliability 
challenge. What it tells us, I submit, is not that perceptualism has an answer to this 
challenge, but only that some perceptualists face a version of the challenge that is 
slightly different from the one intuitionists face. If Sam explicitly infers wrongness 
from cat-burning because he intuits that cat-burning implies wrongness, the 
intuitionist needs to show that her view can explain, or at least does not render 
inexplicable, the reliability of Sam’s moral intuition. Similarly, if Diane’s perceptual 
system sub-personally infers wrongness from cat-burning via a subdoxastic state that 
grounds such inferences, the perceptualist needs to show that his view can explain, 
or at least does not render inexplicable, the reliability of Diane’s subdoxastic state.  
One might try to resist this parallel, maintaining that the standards for 
subdoxastic states should be different than for beliefs. But this is implausible. Suppose 
Sam’s intuition is merely a product of his culture. (I assume merely for illustrative 
purposes that such an explanation has skeptical implications.) Sam therefore believes, 
but does not know, that the particular cat-burning before him is wrong. Now suppose 
that Diane’s subdoxastic state has a precisely analogous cultural explanation, perhaps 
even the same one; it just happened to produce a subdoxastic state in her, but an 
intuition in Sam. Is it possible that Diane knows that the cat-burning before her is 
wrong? Surely not. Diane cannot possess knowledge, while Sam lacks it, simply 
because her inference is sub-personal, while his is explicit.  
This recommends a simple expansion of the reliability challenge. Call 
something an inference-grounding state just in case it is either a belief or a subdoxastic 
state that grounds inferences. We should accept: 
Reliability Challenge Realists must explain, or at last show 
that their view does not render inexplicable, the reliability of moral 
inference-grounding states. 
 I have already argued that perceptualism enjoys no advantage here when it 
comes to moral perceptions that are mediated by background beliefs. The question 
given Werner’s arguments is whether perceptualism enjoys any advantage when it 
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comes to moral perceptions that are mediated by subdoxastic states. As I now argue, 
the same considerations that led me to deny perceptualism any advantage in the 
former case likewise support denying it any in the latter.  
 
3. Moral Perception and the Reliability Challenge 
As seen in §1, I previously offered a regress argument against the possibility of 
independent perceptual moral knowledge. Framed in terms of the Reliability 
Challenge, the upshot of my argument was meant to be that accounting for the 
reliability of perceptual moral beliefs will always require accounting for the reliability 
of non-perceptual moral beliefs.  
 We might simply generalize my point in light of Werner’s arguments; the 
claim would be that accounting for the reliability of perceptual moral beliefs requires 
accounting for the reliability of non-perceptual subdoxastic states. The problem with 
this is that we don’t have a good account of what makes a subdoxastic state 
perceptual or non-perceptual. By definition, if an inference is dependent on a non-
perceptual belief, the inferred belief is not independently perceptual. But the same is 
not true of sub-personal inferences: even if a subdoxastic state is not formed by 
perception, the inferences it grounds might still count as independently perceptual. 
Suppose, for instance, that we are evolutionarily hard-wired to experience certain 
facial expressions as expressing certain emotions—e.g., we possess a subdoxastic state 
that grounds sub-personal inferences from (say) experiences of scowls to experiences 
of anger. Arguably, my knowledge that my interlocutor is angry might still count as 
independently perceptual.  
 This suggests that I was mistaken to frame things in terms of whether moral 
epistemology is “purely” perceptual (Faraci 2015, 2059). But it does not suggest that I 
am wrong to think that perceptualists enjoy no advantages in explaining our 
reliability. For our guiding question now is not whether the relevant subdoxastic 
states are in some sense perceptual, but whether available accounts of their reliability, 
or evidence that such an account is compatible with realism, rely on their perceptual 
nature. If not—if the accounts on offer are the same or sufficiently similar to the 
accounts an intuitionist might give—then perceptualism isn’t any better off than 
intuitionism where the Reliability Challenge is concerned.   
The problem for perceptualism here is simple: perception alone never 
provides an answer to the Reliability Challenge. We always need to account for the 
reliability of perceptual experience. The reason perception can seem promising is that 
the reliability of a great deal of perceptual experience seems fairly easy to account 
for. Consider, for example, Werner’s discussion of chair-perception: 
We presumably don’t have an innate representation of chairs. Nor do 
we learn what chairs are by a priori reflection. Rather, we have an 
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ability to gain the ability to perceive chairs via a complicated feedback 
loop of reinforced and undermined perceptions of chair-like objects. 
(Werner forthcoming) 
 This is an attractively simple story, one that seems well-suited to account for 
our reliability. First, there is a tight connection (perhaps identity) between the bits of 
the world that explain our chair-experiences and being a chair. Second, in part 
because we gain competence with the concept CHAIR through the relevant feedback 
process, there is a similarly tight connection between those bits of the world and our 
conceptual model of a chair. Putting these together, it might be that reliably 
identifying chairs requires nothing more than consistently applying our CHAIR 
concept.  
 Contrast this with perception of H2O. As with chairs, there is a tight 
connection (perhaps identity) between the bits of the world that explain my H2O-
experiences (water) and being H2O. But unlike with chairs, we do not perceive 
something as H2O merely by applying our concepts of HYDROGEN, TWO and OXYGEN. 
To explain our reliability, therefore, we need to tell a further story about how we 
learned to identify the relevant bits of the world as H2O. 
 Which of these stories the moral realist can echo depends on her other 
metaethical commitments. To echo the chair-perception story, the realist must hold 
that Diane can reliably identify wrongness merely through consistent application of 
her concept WRONG. Arguably, such an account is available only to analytic 
naturalists.8 
 Other realists can tell a story echoing the one about H2O-perception, on the 
assumption that the supervenience relation between (e.g.) wrongness and cat-
burning can play the same role here as the identity relation between water and H2O. 
Beliefs that cat-burnings are wrong, inferred from experiences of cat-burning, 
reliably track wrongness because wrongness supervenes on cat-burning (we may 
suppose). But as with H2O-perception, these perceptualists need an account of how 
we come to reliably identify cat-burnings as wrong. 
 It is here that my regress rears its head. Diane’s perceptual system must learn 
to identify cat-burnings as wrong. As I pointed out, if her system learned this through 
experience, it seems this could only have been by correlating independent 
experiences of wrongness and experiences of (features of) cat-burnings. Given the 
                                                 
8 I previously acknowledged that of all realists, analytic naturalists are most likely to be able to 
sidestep my arguments (Faraci 2015, §2.3). Such theorists might hold, I suggested, that moral and 
non-moral experiences have the same experiential content, and thus that no background 
knowledge is needed to ‘transition’ between non-moral and moral experiences. If seeing 
something as cat-burning is experientially the same as seeing it as wrong, then arguably no 
background knowledge is needed to facilitate an inference from one to the other. 
8 
 
inferential nature of moral experience (as per P1 of the argument in §1), those 
independent experiences of wrongness would have to be dependent on her perceptual 
system’s having learned further such correlations, which requires further moral 
experiences. And so on.9 The relevant lesson is that the explanation for Diane’s ability 
to reliably identify cat-burnings as wrong will have to appeal to something 
antecedent to the workings of her perceptual system. 
Of course, that the solution to the Reliability Challenge must be antecedent 
to the workings of our perceptual systems doesn’t suggest that perceptualists can’t 
meet that challenge. But it does suggest that it will not be the perceptual elements of 
the view that provide the solution to the challenge, and thus that the solution, 
whatever it is, will not be distinctively perceptualist-friendly. 
Of course, we can’t be sure that this is the case until we know how 
perceptualists will actually meet the Reliability Challenge. But looking at Werner’s 
gestures in this direction help bolster the point. Start with the analogy with chair-
perception. Suppose someone held, contra Werner, that our concept CHAIR is innate, 
and thus that chair-perception is facilitated by a priori knowledge. Is this intuitionist 
view any worse off where the Reliability Challenge is concerned? It is hard to see 
how. Surely it is the fact that being reliable requires only conceptual competence, not 
the fact that such competence is gained perceptually, that accounts for this view’s 
ability to meet the Reliability Challenge. Likewise, it would seem to be the analytic 
not the perceptualism in ‘analytic perceptualism’ that does the heavy lifting where 
the Reliability Challenge is concerned. If any intuitionists can answer that challenge, 
it is analytic naturalists. 
Next consider two suggestions Werner gives concerning the potential 
workings of our moral perceptual systems. He says that perhaps we can capitalize on 
our affective system’s “ability to represent objects, people, and events as aversive or 
attractive. Or perhaps the perceptual system alone has evolved to represent things in 
this way, in order to facilitate quick action” (Werner forthcoming). 
 True, our affective systems can represent things as aversive or attractive. But 
this feature of our affective systems has often been used to challenge our reliability, 
not vindicate it. It is sometimes argued that certain moral reactions’ affective 
provenance should lead us to shun them in favor of ones with more ‘rational’ bases.10 
                                                 
9 By contrast, the story about H2O-perception can stop after a finite number of iterations. Someone 
might correlate independent experiences of water with hydrogen and oxygen molecules viewed 
through an electron microscope. Then we may have to consider how he learned to identify what 
he sees in the microscope as hyrdrogen and oxygen. Unlike in the moral case, there is no principled 
reason to think this regress will continue indefinitely. 
10 See, e.g., Greene (2008) and Singer (2005). To be clear, I am not endorsing such arguments; I 
agree more with opponents such as Kahane (2014).  
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The implicit assumption here is that the former are less likely to be reliable, that it is 
our reason, rather than our affective responses, that reflects the moral truth. We can 
see why replying that such affective responses are perceptual is attractive; calling 
something perceptual implies that it does reflect the truth. But without an account of 
how, or at least evidence that this is the case, the Reliability Challenge goes 
untouched, and the appeal to perception is merely a distraction.  
Similarly, it is hardly seen as an epistemic boon for our moral beliefs that we 
have evolved to have them. This, too, stands at the center of a popular epistemological 
objection: since there is no apparent reason to believe that evolution tracks the moral 
truth, the evolutionary origins of our moral intuitions should make us doubt their 
reliability.11 It is hard to see why the lesson changes if we shift from an explanation 
of moral beliefs to an explanation of moral experiences. An evolutionary explanation 
seems no better or worse suited to explain the reliability of moral perception than it 
does moral intuition.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Perceptual epistemology is attractive because for much of our perceptual knowledge, 
our reliability does not seem particularly mysterious. Perhaps I know that’s a chair 
simply because the physical object impedes upon my experience and fits my concept 
CHAIR. Analytic naturalists may be able to tell an equally simple and compelling story 
about moral knowledge. But it is their analytic naturalism, not their perceptualism, 
that gives them this ability. What remains for everyone else is a puzzle about how 
our perceptual systems learn that certain non-moral experiences are indicative of 
certain moral features. That puzzle is only marginally different from, and arguably 
no less difficult than, the analogous puzzle regarding moral intuitions. There may 
well be many other reasons to pursue moral perception—even, as Werner has shown, 
epistemologies that are in an important sense purely perceptual. But perceptualism 
ultimately does nothing to address arguably the deepest worry about the possibility 
of moral knowledge. 
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